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Much of the change that social movements try to accomplish requires changing practices inside organizations, yet reformimplementation is difficult to achieve. This comparative case study of two hospitals demonstrates that implementing
reform inside organizations may require internal reformers not only to mobilize with one another but also to stand up
to internal defenders’ countertactics in everyday encounters. Because reformer alliances across identity lines often require
reformers with different statuses to collaborate with one another, defenders can divide reformer coalitions by linking reform
practices to a status characteristic associated with lower-status reformers, denigrating higher-status reformers by associating
them with these practices, and reintegrating higher-status reformers into the defender group. When status threat inside an
organization is high to begin with, higher-status reformers are likely to be concerned about loss of privilege in the face
of defenders’ status-based countertactics and, in response, distance themselves from reform practices and align themselves
with defenders to protect their identity and its rewards. This can undermine the multi-identity reformer coalition and cause
change to fail. These findings regarding status-based countertactics contribute to our understanding of social movement
implementation and microinstitutional change.
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Introduction
Social movements often fight for new regulations
intended to protect organizations’ employees or cus-
tomers (e.g., Davis et al. 2005, 2008; Edelman et al.
2010; Lounsbury et al. 2003; McAdam and Scott 2005;
Rao et al. 2000; Soule and King 2006). But these
new regulations do not automatically compel organiza-
tions to change practices (DiMaggio and Powell 1983,
Edelman 1992, Meyer and Rowan 1977). Indeed, organi-
zations often subvert the reforms that social movements
have worked so hard to achieve (e.g., King and Pearce
2010, Zald et al. 2005).
Both social movement theory and neo-institutional
theory have addressed the question of how and when
macro-level changes fail to lead to change on the ground
inside organizations. Social movement theory focuses on
macro-level changes in frames and identities, mobilizing
structures, and political opportunities that allow insid-
ers to claim specific rights and demand the transforma-
tion of their organizations (Banaszak-Holl et al. 2010,
Fligstein and McAdam 2011, Gamson 1992, Haveman
and Rao 1997, McAdam 1982, McCarthy and Zald
1977, Snow and Benford 1988, Taylor and Zald 2010).
It explains that changes fail to be implemented when
external resources are weak, when top managers resist
reform, and when internal reformers fail to mobilize
(e.g., Kellogg 2009, Lounsbury 2001, O’Mahony and
Bechky 2008, Scully and Segal 2002, Weber et al.
2009b). Neo-institutional theory draws attention to new
coercive, normative, or mimetic pressures that organi-
zations must respond to in some way to preserve their
legitimacy (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Meyer and
Rowan 1977, Oliver 1991, Scott 2007). It demonstrates
that changes fail to be implemented when such pres-
sures are weak or inconsistent, when there are high
symbolic gains from program adoption but also high
costs associated with implementation, and when orga-
nizational actors have professional identities or back-
grounds that conflict with the proposed change (e.g.,
Barley 1986, Edelman and Petterson 1999, Edelman and
Suchman 1997, Fligstein 1985, Heimer 1999, Heimer
and Staffen 1998, Lounsbury 2007, Powell 1991, Sauder
and Espeland 2009, Westphal and Zajac 1994).
The social movement and neo-institutional literatures
have been critical to explaining how and when macro-
level changes may be blocked inside organizations, but
we must add to them to explain the outcomes I observed
in my field study of two U.S. hospitals. Historically,
surgical trainees (“residents”) in U.S. hospitals worked
100–120 hours per week. A social movement composed
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of patient safety and resident rights activists fought for
and, in 2002, successfully pressured the American Coun-
cil for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) to intro-
duce regulation to reduce the work week for residents to
80 hours.
Hospital administrators responded to the new reg-
ulation by developing programs to reduce resident
work hours. Yet the implementation of these programs
was contested inside hospitals across the country (e.g.,
Landrigan et al. 2006). The two teaching hospitals I
studied responded differently to the new regulation: At
Calhoun, reform was defeated after a lengthy struggle.
At Advent, it was successfully implemented. (Both hos-
pital names are pseudonyms.)
As I show below, the two hospitals were exposed to
the same external resources and pressures. They were
comparable in terms of industry sector, work organiza-
tion, prior organizational performance, and other char-
acteristics that have been shown to affect organizational
response to external pressure for change. And in both,
top managers created similar programs to help resi-
dents reduce their work hours and frontline reform-
ers mobilized for change. How, then, can we explain
the difference in social movement implementation and
microinstitutional change in the two organizations?
In a prior article, I analyzed the successful implemen-
tation of reform at Advent and its failure at a comparable
hospital (Bayshore). I demonstrated that reformer mobi-
lization was responsible for successful reform at Advent
and that, at the other hospital, reform was defeated
because internal reformers did not mobilize with one
another across ranks in the hierarchy to collectively act
for change (Kellogg 2009). However, the lack of internal
reformer mobilization cannot explain why reform fal-
tered at Calhoun, and it is this failure that I explain here.
Here, I detail how at both Calhoun and Advent inter-
nal reformers mobilized to challenge defenders of the
status quo. In fact, Calhoun actually had both a slightly
greater number and greater percentage of these mobi-
lized internal reformers than did Advent. Yet reform was
not accomplished at Calhoun though it was at Advent.
I demonstrate that, to explain how and when macro-
level changes fail to be implemented inside organiza-
tions, we must take into account not only the actions of
external reformers, top managers, and frontline reform-
ers but also the actions of internal defenders. In orga-
nizations where reform requires the collaboration of
reformers with different identities and statuses, internal
defenders can leverage status in their countertactics to
persuade higher-status reformers to abandon their coali-
tion with lower-status reformers and stop pressing for
change. When status threat inside an organization is high
to begin with, higher-status reformers are likely to be
concerned about loss of privilege in the face of defend-
ers’ status-based countertactics and, in response, dis-
tance themselves from reform practices and align them-
selves with defenders to protect their identity and its
rewards.
In what follows, I review the social movement and
neo-institutional literature on failed reform implemen-
tation and microinstitutional change, and I describe the
research setting and the details of the research design. I
then explain the difference in outcomes at the two hospi-
tals by recounting how reformers at both hospitals mobi-
lized with one another across identities and statuses and
how defenders at one of the hospitals undermined the
reformers’ cross-identity coalition. I end by discussing
the implications of status-based countertactics for under-
standing social movement implementation and microin-
stitutional change.
Current Understanding of Failed Reform
Implementation and Microinstitutional
Change
Social movement theory and neo-institutional the-
ory have each examined how and when macro-level
changes fail to lead to changes on the ground inside
organizations.
Social Movement Theory
Social movement theorists have emphasized that imple-
menting reform inside organizations is difficult because
it requires organization members to mobilize with one
another and challenge the status quo (Davis et al. 2005,
2008; Lounsbury et al. 2003; McAdam and Scott 2005;
Rao et al. 2000; Soule and King 2006; Zald et al. 2005).
To do this, reformers must begin to see traditional prac-
tices as unfair and illegitimate (e.g., Creed et al. 2002,
Kaplan 2008, Rao et al. 2003, Weber and Dacin 2011).
They must ready themselves to take personal risks on
behalf of the group as a whole (Moore 1996, O’Mahony
and Bechky 2008, Scully et al. 1998). And they must
develop a belief that collective action efforts against
defenders can be successful (Binder 2002, Katzenstein
1998, Kellogg 2011b).
Three sets of actors are critical to accomplishing such
mobilization—external reformers, top managers, and
internal reformers. External reformers create frames that
provide internal reformers with arguments for change,
identities that provide them with new prescriptions for
appropriate lines of action, mobilizing structures that
provide them with the community and solidarity neces-
sary to take the risks associated with protest, and polit-
ical opportunities that provide them with leverage to
make new claims (e.g., Fligstein 2001, Gamson 1990,
Haveman et al. 2007, McAdam et al. 1996, Schneiberg
and Lounsbury 2008, Snow et al. 1986, Taylor 1996,
Weber et al. 2008). Top managers, when they are
supportive of social movement reform, develop poli-
cies and commit resources to facilitate social move-
ment implementation in their organizations (e.g., Briscoe
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and Safford 2008, Scully and Segal 2002, Zald et al.
2005). Internal reformers use frames, identities, mobi-
lizing structures, and political opportunities created by
external reformers and available inside their organiza-
tions to organize with one another (e.g., Binder 2002,
Gutierrez et al. 2010, Katzenstein 1998, Kellogg 2009,
Moore 2008, Weber et al. 2009b).
Social movement theorists demonstrate that success
in implementing social movement reform depends on
the strength of these external and internal resources, on
the internal reformers’ connection with those who con-
trol them, and on the intraorganizational context (e.g.,
Lounsbury 2001, Morrill et al. 2003, Raeburn 2004).
Reform is likely to fail when social movement frames
or identities do not resonate with the beliefs of those
within the organization, when mobilizing structures do
not allow reformers to build solidarity with one another,
when political opportunities or threats do not lower the
costs of collective action, or when internal reformers do
not have resources available to them.
Neo-Institutional Theory
Whereas social movement theorists demonstrate that
macro-level changes provide new resources for inter-
nal reformers, neo-institutional theorists show that these
changes also exert external pressures that organizations
must respond to if they are to preserve their legitimacy
in the eyes of important stakeholders (DiMaggio and
Powell 1983, Greenwood et al. 2008, Scott 2007, Scott
et al. 2000). Sometimes, however, institutional pressures
are brought by outsiders who do not understand how to
best require or measure change, who provide ambigu-
ous criteria by which to identify compliance, who fail to
address the organizational issues that members believe
need attention, or who propose changes that run counter
to the interests of powerful organization members (e.g.,
Edelman 1990, Gouldner 1954, Selznick 1949, Silbey
1981). In such instances, actors within organizations
often thwart efforts to bring about macro-level changes
(e.g., Meyer and Rowan 1977).
Three sets of actors are critical to thwarting institu-
tional pressure for change—top managers, middle man-
agers, and frontline workers. Top managers can buffer
their organizations from change through strategic activ-
ities such as decoupling, compromising, defying, or
controlling (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Edelman
1992, Meyer and Rowan 1977, Oliver 1991, Silbey
1984). Middle managers can block change by dissuading
their subordinates from using new programs provided by
top managers in response to institutional pressures (e.g.,
Edelman et al. 1993, 2001; Harlan and Robert 1998;
Heimer 1999; Heimer and Staffen 1998; Kelly and Kalev
2006). And, frontline workers can block change by pur-
posely misinterpreting programs introduced by top man-
agers in order to continue to work in traditional ways
(e.g., Hallett and Ventresca 2006). Organizations are
most likely to subvert institutional pressures when exter-
nal constituencies, legitimacy threats, or legal contexts
are weak or inconsistent or when, despite the high sym-
bolic gains associated with adoption, there are also high
costs associated with implementation (e.g., D’Aunno
et al. 1991, Lounsbury 2007, Powell 1991, Sauder and
Espeland 2009, Westphal and Zajac 1994). Organiza-
tions are also likely to subvert institutional pressures
when organizational actors have professional identities
or backgrounds that conflict with the proposed change
(e.g., Anteby 2010, Barley 1986, Fligstein 1985, Heimer
1999, Heimer and Staffen 1998).
The social movement and neo-institutional literatures
have provided important explanations for how and when
macro-level changes may be blocked inside organiza-
tions, but we must add to our understanding of the rela-
tionship between the macro-environment and intraorga-
nizational dynamics to explain the outcomes I observed
in my study. As I elaborate in further detail below, the
two hospitals were exposed to the same social movement
resources and institutional pressures and were matched
on the characteristics that have been shown to affect
organizational response to external pressure for change.
In both hospitals, organizational elites created similar
programs to help residents reduce their work hours,
and frontline reformers mobilized for change. However,
Calhoun ultimately rejected reform, whereas Advent
embraced it. To explain this difference in outcomes, we
need to bring an understanding of internal defenders,
countertactics, and status into our explanations of reform
implementation and microinstitutional change.
Bringing Internal Defenders, Countertactics,
and Status into Our Understanding of Reform
Implementation and Microinstitutional Change
Implementing social change inside organizations often
requires internal reformers to build alliances with one
another across lines—whether across lines of identity
or position or privilege (e.g., Kellogg 2009, Zald and
Berger 1978). Such coalitions of reformers have been
shown to be fragile and difficult to sustain because
different subgroups of reformers have different goals,
different frames, or different practices (e.g., Foldy
et al. 2009; Gamson 1990, 1961; McCammon and
Campbell 2002; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Van Dyke
and McCammon 2010). Yet even when reformer sub-
groups are similar across organizations, reformer coali-
tions may survive and successfully accomplish change
in one organization and not in the other. Indeed, this is
precisely what occurred at Calhoun and Advent.
To understand why, it is helpful to understand the
dynamics associated with defenders, countertactics, and
status. Movements of any visibility and impact create
conditions for the mobilization of countermovements,
which seek to preserve long-standing institutions by
minimizing reforms (e.g., Meyer and Staggenborg 1996,
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Zald and Useem 1987). In response to a movement’s
frames, mobilizing structures, and political opportuni-
ties, defenders may create opposing frames, mobilizing
structures, and political opportunities to discredit, under-
mine, and resist those of the reformers (Ingram and
Rao 2004, Ingram et al. 2010). Defenders may also try
to break apart coalitions by emphasizing objective dif-
ferences in interests among reformer subgroups (e.g.,
Brown 2000, Brueggemann and Boswell 1998).
As I elaborate below, I find that because some iden-
tities are linked to higher social positions than others,
defenders can also break apart reformer coalitions by
highlighting similarities between higher-status reform-
ers and their lower-status counterparts. This threatens
the social position of the higher-status reformers and
the privileges they enjoy as occupants of that position.
Scholars of status highlight two aspects of status that are
important to the analysis presented in this paper: status
characteristics and status threat.
An identity distinction among people is a status char-
acteristic when widely held cultural beliefs associate
greater worthiness and competence with one identity
than with another (e.g., Berger et al. 1977). For exam-
ple, gender is a status characteristic in this country
because cultural expectations associate higher status and
competence with men than with women (see Ridgeway
2011 for a review). Differentiated performance expec-
tations operate in a self-fulfilling way—because high-
status actors are expected to offer more competent
performances, they are given more opportunities to par-
ticipate, have more influence over others in a group, and
have their performances evaluated more positively (e.g.,
Ridgeway and Correll 2004, Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin
1999, Wagner and Berger 1997). Actors with lower-
status characteristics, on the other hand, end up receiv-
ing biased evaluations of competence and commitment;
have stricter evaluation standards applied to their perfor-
mances; and suffer bias in hiring, promotion, and salary
decisions (e.g., Correll et al. 2007, Loyd et al. 2010,
Ridgeway 2001).
Status threat comes into play because status is not
fixed but is performed minute by minute in everyday
actions and interactions (see Sauder 2005 for a review).
Actors risk status loss when they deviate from accepted
identity performances (e.g., Zuckerman 1999). Because
high-status actors are secure in their group member-
ship and have a great deal of control over their audi-
ences, and because audiences assume that actions are
of greater value when they are performed by high-
status actors, high-status actors can often get away
with deviating from expected performances (e.g., Gould
2002, Hollander 1958, Podolny 1993, Rao et al. 2005).
But when an actor’s status is not definite—when there
is some chance that his status is under threat—he
faces strong pressure to conform to expected behaviors
(Phillips and Zuckerman 2001).
Theorists have noted that status threat comes in a vari-
ety of forms: (1) competitive threat, which arises from a
lower status group newly competing for resources previ-
ously reserved for the higher status group; (2) distinctive-
ness threat, which occurs when distinctions between the
lower status and higher status groups are blurred, cast-
ing doubt on the legitimacy of benefits based on these
distinctions; (3) category threat, which arises when an
individual is categorized against his will as a member
of a lower status group than that to which he feels he
belongs; and (4) acceptance threat, which challenges an
individual’s membership in a higher status group (e.g.,
Berdahl 2007, Blalock 1973, Branscombe et al. 1999,
Duguid et al. 2012). Status threats can cause high-status
actors to defend their position by discriminating against
the lower-status group, emphasizing the veracity of dif-
ferences between groups, dissociating themselves from
lower-status partners, and refraining from low-status
actions to prove themselves worthy of membership in the
high-status group (Bendersky 2009, Bendersky and Hays
2012, Olzak et al. 1994, South et al. 1982, Willer 2005).
Status theory helps us to understand how status-based
processes shape the behavior of actors in interaction.
However, to explain the divergence in social movement
outcomes I saw at Calhoun and Advent, it is necessary
to add to this theory in two ways. First, because those
studying status have not focused on countermobilization,
we do not understand the ways defenders of the status
quo can use status as a weapon to divide reformer coali-
tions pressing for change. Second, previous research on
status has demonstrated that status characteristics have
a strong effect on performance expectations when they
are deemed relevant to the task at hand, but we do not
understand how status characteristics can also affect per-
formance expectations under conditions of status threat.
In this paper, I demonstrate that, because particular
identities (such as male or female) are linked to partic-
ular status positions, reformer alliances across identity
lines may require collaboration between reformers with
different statuses. Defenders of the status quo can break
apart such cross-identity reformer coalitions by linking
reform practices to a status characteristic associated with
lower-status reformers, denigrating higher-status reform-
ers by associating them with these practices, and trying
to reintegrate higher-status reformers into the defender
group. When status threat inside an organization is high
to begin with, higher-status reformers are particularly
likely to experience concerns about loss of privilege,
leading them to try to protect their position and its
rewards by distancing themselves from the practices of
lower-status reformers and visibly aligning themselves
with higher-status defenders. This, in turn, can under-
mine the multi-identity reformer coalition and defeat
reform implementation and microinstitutional change. In
what follows, I review the methods used in the study and
then describe how change unfolded in the two hospitals
and why.
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Methods
This paper draws on qualitative data collection and his-
torical comparison to generate grounded theory. The two
hospitals studied, Calhoun and Advent, were selected
because they are located in the same region, did sim-
ilar work, and responded to the same regulation. The
sequence of the research was (1) new regulation was
announced, (2) two similar hospitals were studied during
the period just before and one year after the introduction
of new programs designed to comply with the regulation,
and (3) data were examined to determine the process by
which reform was implemented at one hospital and not
the other.
Study of Matched Cases
As noted earlier, Calhoun and Advent are remarkably
similar in each of the organizational characteristics that
have been shown to affect organizational change in
response to external pressure. Both are elite teaching
hospitals associated with major medical schools in the
same urban geographic area. Both are public sector orga-
nizations, both share a positive performance history and
image, and both employ residents with similar back-
grounds. The hospitals are well matched in terms of top
manager interests and surgical conditions treated on the
services studied.
Authority relations in the two hospitals were also sim-
ilar. Directors of the surgery department were surgeons
who managed administrative issues associated with the
activities of the other staff surgeons and the surgical resi-
dency program but who had little authority over the day-
to-day practices of these staff surgeons. Staff surgeons
brought revenue to the hospitals by bringing in surgical
patients. Surgical residents assisted these staff surgeons
who, in turn, provided them with hands-on training.
Teams of “chiefs” (fifth-year residents), “seniors”
(second-, third-, and fourth-year residents), and “interns”
(first-year residents) took care of 10–20 patients on
any particular surgery service (e.g., vascular surgery).
All residents “rotated” through areas such as general
surgery, trauma, and other specialties, frequently chang-
ing work groups. Chief residents formulated daily plans
for each patient on the service and assisted staff sur-
geons in difficult “cases” (operations) throughout the
day. Interns implemented patient plans and assisted staff
surgeons with simple cases. Senior residents were less
involved than were chiefs and interns in the daily care
of patients; they cared for the complex issues of general
surgery patients and assisted staff surgeons with moder-
ately difficult cases.
There were several differences among the hospitals,
but none can explain why Calhoun did not implement
reform whereas Advent did. The first is size. Calhoun
is larger than Advent. Institutional theorists have sug-
gested that larger organizations are associated with early
adoption of compliance programs because they often
have greater resources to invest in new programs and
are more visible to governance bodies (Dobbin et al.
1988, Edelman 1992). This would lead us to expect
that Calhoun would have implemented reform whereas
Advent would not, yet the opposite was true.
Second, the hospitals experienced slightly different
forms of regulatory pressure, yet these differences can-
not explain why Advent reformed whereas Calhoun did
not. In the spring of 2002, the ACGME announced
that the new regulation would go into effect in July
2003. Advent experienced additional pressure because
the ACGME had scheduled a site visit for that year.
Advent introduced their compliance programs during
the residency year of July 2002–June 2003 to signal
their good intentions to the ACGME. Calhoun, not up
for review from the ACGME until several years later,
introduced their compliance program the following year,
when the regulation actually went into effect. This dif-
ference in the form of regulatory pressure (ACGME
site visit versus regulation officially in place) cannot
explain the difference in change outcomes. Because
Calhoun faced officially mandated work hour reduction
(and risked the loss of accreditation if they did not meet
the goal), one would expect that the environmental pres-
sure would be greater in forcing change than it would at
Advent. Because Advent effected change and Calhoun
did not, differences in the form of regulatory pressure
cannot explain the difference in outcomes.
Finally, Calhoun had a higher percentage of female
residents than Advent (and a similar percentage of
female staff surgeons). Because the current literature
emphasizes the importance of internal reformers in
effecting change, we might expect that the hospital with
the higher percentage of female residents would embrace
change, given that female residents were more avid inter-
nal reformers than were male residents. Yet just the
opposite occurred (I will explain this counterintuitive
result below).
Data Collection
This paper is part of a larger ethnographic study of med-
ical reform in surgery that I conducted from 2002 to
2004 (Kellogg 2011a). I began my study of Calhoun and
Advent by doing a “surface analysis” (Spradley 1979)
of the culture and work practices before the initiation
of the change effort. On the basis of these interviews, I
made some delimiting choices about the particular area
on which to focus my in-depth analysis (Spradley 1979).
Because interns worked the longest hours and would be
most affected by the changes, and because the actions
of their managers, the chief residents, would be criti-
cal to interns’ compliance with the new regulation, I
focused on the practices that interns and chiefs would
need to change to help the interns comply with the new
regulation.
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Table 1 General Surgery Chief Residents and Interns
Interviewed at the Two Hospitals
Residents Calhoun Advent
Male chiefs 5 6
Female chiefs 3 1
Male interns 5 4
Female interns 3 3
Total chiefs and interns 16 14
Total interviews (pre and post) 32 27a
aOne of these six male chiefs at Advent was only interviewed
post change effort.
I conducted a total of 59 semistructured interviews
with chief residents and interns, first before their new
compliance program was introduced and then 12 months
later, at the end of the residency year (see Table 1).
The interviews, performed at the hospital and averaging
between 30 minutes to 1 hour, were recorded and tran-
scribed verbatim. I also spent time talking informally to
groups of two or three residents in the surgical resident
lounge and hospital cafeteria both before the resident
year under study began and at its end.
To gauge support for the reform, in my prechange
interviews I asked respondents how the impending
changes would affect patient care, resident education,
and their own quality of life outside the hospital. I also
asked them to report their overall attitude toward the
reform.
In my end-of-year interviews, I asked residents to
describe what actions related to implementing the
reform were undertaken by the residents. I did not ask
any explicit questions about status, countertactics, or
gender. Instead, these themes emerged unsolicited as
respondents discussed the traditional surgical culture in
prechange interviews and answered questions about how
reform unfolded in their postchange interviews.
To measure how everyday practices actually changed
in response to the new regulation, I purposely did not
ask residents how many hours per week they were work-
ing before and after the proposed changes, as I was told
by the residents that there might be pressure on interns
to misreport their work hours so that the hospitals would
not risk sanction from the ACGME. Instead, I asked
residents to detail in prechange interviews which work
practices would be required to enable interns to reduce
their work hours to 80 per week and how often they
currently engaged in these work practices. In my end-of-
year interviews, I asked them how often they participated
in each of these work practices required for compliance.
Analysis of Contradictory Outcomes
Once I had determined that changes in everyday practice
had occurred at Advent and not at Calhoun, I contrasted
the two cases to identify the processes associated with
the different outcomes. My inductive analysis (Glaser
and Strauss 1967) consisted of multiple readings of
interview transcripts as well as tracking patterned activi-
ties and issues related to change in ATLAS.ti, a qualita-
tive data analysis program. In my coding of the interview
transcripts, I associated virtually every passage with one
or more codes that flagged highly specific but recurring
topics related to change in the targeted practice. I pro-
vide more information about my analyses below.
Similar Initial Conditions at
the Two Hospitals
Similar Historical and Planned New Practices at
Calhoun and Advent
To understand the change process at Calhoun and
Advent, it is necessary to understand both historical and
planned resident practices. Historically, at both hospitals,
chiefs and seniors had worked approximately 100 hours
and interns approximately 120 hours per week.
At both hospitals, top managers introduced similar
“night float” programs to allow residents to reduce their
hours. These new programs added additional surgical
residents to general surgery services, creating a “night
float team” to work overnight each night; this team now
could cover the two nights per week that chiefs, seniors,
and interns had been obliged to be on call. To staff these
teams, directors at both hospitals eliminated other surgi-
cal resident rotations so that their own surgical residents
would be freed up to serve on night float teams covering
the general surgery services. In addition, directors hired
several physician assistants to help with administrative
work during the day.
Under the new system, night float programs would
allow residents at all levels to reduce their hours by
20 per week by virtually eliminating nights spent on call.
This would put chiefs and seniors in compliance with
the regulation. To further reduce intern hours to about 80
per week, interns would need to reduce the number of
hours they worked on a regular workday from roughly
17 (4 a.m. to 9 p.m.) to roughly 13 (6 a.m. to 7 p.m.).
Although reducing the number of nights spent on call
was easy to do at both hospitals once top managers had
secured additional resources for the night float programs,
shortening intern workdays was more difficult to accom-
plish because it required changing long-standing surgical
work practices.
Under the traditional system, chiefs had been respon-
sible for overseeing all of the routine work associated
with pre- and postoperative care, and interns had been
the ones to carry out this work. Residents on a particu-
lar service had gathered together every evening between
5 p.m. and 7 p.m. for afternoon rounds, at which time
chiefs reviewed the work the intern had done for each
patient that day and gave the intern a list of tasks that
needed to be completed after rounds (“post-round to-
dos”). When chiefs and seniors were not working on call
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overnight, they left the hospital immediately after after-
noon rounds. But interns who were not working on call
overnight did not attempt to hand off any routine work
tasks, such as completing post-round to-dos, doing the
paperwork required to admit a new patient (“admits”),
or checking in with recovery room nurses about patients
who had been operated on that day (“post-ops”), to the
on-call resident. Interns took care of all of this “scut-
work,” even though doing so required them to stay in the
hospital until about 9 p.m. and arrive the next morning at
4 a.m. Taking care of all of the scutwork also required
interns to come in on Saturdays, even when they were
not officially scheduled to do so.
Under the new system, night floats would cover all
patient care work and scutwork from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m.
Chiefs would be required to encourage interns to hand
off any uncompleted work, including scutwork, to night
floats, help interns finish their post-round to-dos, and
instruct interns not to come in on Saturdays when not
scheduled to do so. Interns would need to follow suit by
handing off any post-ops (checks on patients after they
came out of the operating room) and admits (new patient
admissions to the hospital) not completed by 6 p.m.,
seeking help with post-round to-dos, and not coming
in on unscheduled Saturdays. Chiefs and interns would
work 13-hour days, 6 days per week, to allow for 1 hour
of overlap on each end of the day. These work hour
reductions would not entail a reduction in income for
any of the residents; annual salaries were fixed.
Similar Internal Defenders at Calhoun and Advent
One might have expected that the plans for the new night
float programs would have been greeted enthusiastically
by the residents, who would be dramatically reducing
their work hours with no corresponding reduction in pay.
But many residents did not rejoice. In fact, they did the
opposite.
The chiefs and seniors did not object to the fact that
residents would be spending fewer hours overnight on
call. What they objected to was the requirement that
chiefs should encourage interns to hand off routine work
to night floats, help interns finish their post-round to-dos,
and instruct interns not to come in on Saturdays when
not scheduled to do so.
The intensity of their negative reaction seemed to
me quite disproportionate to what was, after all, a rel-
atively insignificant change in surgical practice. One
would think that their taking on an additional bit of rou-
tine work would be amply recompensed by the dramatic
reduction of their own work hours. Furthermore, they
themselves, relieved from having to work every third
night on call, would now be well rested.
To understand why defenders of the status quo at
both hospitals so strongly resisted these seemingly minor
changes, it is necessary to understand how reform prac-
tices ran counter to the traditional identity and status
hierarchy in surgery. Historically, surgical residents were
expected to be male, individualistic, and single-mindedly
focused on work, characteristics they demonstrated by
performing the role of “iron men,” “trusting no one,” and
“living in the hospital.” Even though most residents did
not always act out all of these idealized characteristics,
such behaviors were used to measure performance, and
they were associated with the highest status in surgery.
Iron men (as they identified themselves when they
described the long weekends on call that only surgical
residents engaged in as “iron man weekends”) at each
hospital aspired to be seen as “go-to guys” with “hairy
balls” and “nerves of steel” who were “unflappable”
under pressure. A macho demeanor was de rigueur: hair
was to be closely cropped, scrubs were to be worn low
on the hips, surgical caps and masks were to be left
dangling around their necks long after they had left the
operating room (OR), they were to stride fast during
morning rounds and swagger in the evening, they were
to keep their bodies well toned. Much of their conver-
sation with other residents involved fantasized or actual
sexual exploits of team members. They used battle and
war metaphors repeatedly, talking about “rescue mis-
sions” and “victories” in the OR.
As well as enacting a male persona, iron men were
expected to act as individualistic heroes who could be
counted on to single-handedly “make it happen,” no mat-
ter what the circumstances. One of their favorite sayings
was “Trust no one, expect nothing, suspect sabotage.”
This involved never handing off their work to anyone. In
addition, they were expected to avoid the help of physi-
cian assistants and to discount the counsel of nurses and
other physicians when making their decisions.
Additionally, iron men were expected to be intensely
committed to their work. They accepted without ques-
tion the schedules and vacations they were given and
prided themselves on “living in the hospital.” They
asserted that their “fellow residents were their family”
and rarely mentioned caring about others outside of the
hospital. Instead, they constantly boasted about break-
ing commitments with disaffected wives and significant
others.
This persona of the iron man had its roots in the early
history of the profession. In a time when hygienic con-
ditions were atrocious and when medical cures and tech-
niques were primitive, lives often hinged on the heroic
actions of such individualistic, hypercommitted male
surgeons. Despite all the advances of modern medicine,
because surgical residency has been designed to pro-
duce action-oriented male heroes who single-handedly
perform death-defying feats and courageously act with
certainty in all situations, this image of the ideal surgeon
has not only survived into the present but continues to
flourish (e.g., Cassell 1998).
Historically, residents who have acted as individual-
istic males with a single-minded focus on work have
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occupied a high position not only in the status hierarchy
of surgery but also in the medical profession and in soci-
ety as a whole. One Calhoun iron man highlighted the
way iron man practices distinguished him from workers
in other professions:
It’s not like being an airline pilot 0 0 0 I can tell you per-
sonally, from having been up several days in a row, and
having someone unwell come in. I know exactly what to
do and what needs to be done. I’ll guarantee you that,
at the same post-graduate year of training, I could out-
think or outperform any of our colleagues in other disci-
plines if a crisis came around. Because that’s what we’re
trained for.
Yet at the time of my study, the power and prestige of
surgery had already begun to erode (e.g., Cassell 1998).
The 80-hour workweek was just one more change in a
series of changes that threatened the iron man and his
status. One Advent defender explained in a prechange
interview:
When I first started, surgery ruled the roost. It was testos-
terone city 0 0 0 0 The chief resident was the boss of the
hospital. When the chief spoke, that was it. I don’t care
if there were machine guns in the way, it got done. The
chief was king and the residents were his army 0 0 0 0 It
was a battlefield mentality. Stuff hitting the fan, boom,
boom, boom. It was like the Wild West. You just did
everything. If someone got in your way, you let them
know it. Now you would end up in [Director’s] office
with a letter in your file. One of my chiefs told the MICU
[medical intensive care unit], “You a–holes are killing
this patient.” If you say that now, you are dead 0 0 0 0
Every surgery resident used to be at codes [emergency
surgeries]. Now it is a special code team, and if it is a
medical patient, the meddies are in charge. Now you have
to watch them fiddle around. In the old days the chief
would walk in and say, “I’m running this code.”
Now there are a lot more malpractice suits going on.
And we have to be much more political with the other
services. We used to run the ICU with an iron fist. Now
we are neutered there.
The iron man identity (an identity equally pervasive at
both hospitals) and the power and prestige that had his-
torically been associated with it help explain why some
residents resisted a change that seemed to be designed
to benefit them. At each hospital, defenders of the sta-
tus quo were composed primarily of chief and senior
male residents who were able to accomplish most of
the actions required to live up to the iron man ideal.
Because they were single or had wives or girlfriends
who were willing to cook for them, do shopping and
housecleaning, provide childcare, and put up with fre-
quent last-minute cancellations of social plans, these res-
idents were able to differentiate themselves from others
by demonstrating the key behaviors that counted for high
performance in surgical residency: maleness, individual-
ism, and intense commitment to work.
Whereas, historically, demonstrating high perfor-
mance had required residents to individualistically
accomplish work and be the first ones there and the last
ones to leave, under reform, demonstrating high perfor-
mance required residents to accomplish work as a team
and leave the hospital at the end of the day. The reform
thus challenged the socially constructed measures of per-
formance that had allowed these chief and senior iron
men to distinguish themselves from others. Because sta-
tus, in large part, was based on attributions of perfor-
mance, the reforms threatened to take away their hard-
won status and the privileges associated with it.
Similar Internal Reformers at Calhoun and Advent
Not all residents at the two hospitals were comfort-
able with the iron man expectations, however, and
those who were not became advocates of reform. To
better understand who these reformers were, I coded
my prechange interview data and classified people as
reformers or defenders based on their beliefs upon enter-
ing the new system.1 Reformers fell into three sub-
groups: (1) female chiefs (2) some male chiefs, and (3)
interns (see Table 2).
Female chiefs at the two hospitals advocated reform
primarily because they occupied inferior positions on
the surgical wards and wanted to improve the valu-
ing of women in surgery. Even though they were
able to act like iron men to some extent, they could
never completely live up to the idealized expectations
Table 2 Defenders and Reformers
Reasons for stance on No. at No. at
Residents change in sign-out practice Calhoun Advent
Defenders 3 4
Male chiefs Feel change violates
traditional iron man
expectations and the
professional power and
privilege associated
with these
3 4
Reformers 13 10
Male chiefs Interested in creating
more time for personal
life responsibilities, in
valuing alternative male
identities, and in valuing
team-centered patient
care work outside of the
operating room
2 2
Female
chiefs
Interested in improving
the position of women in
surgery
3 1
Male and
female
interns
Interested in working
80 hours rather than
120 hours; not yet
socialized into
traditional iron man
expectations
8 7
Total 16 14
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that required demonstrating maleness, individualism, and
intense commitment to work. They were not allowed
to enter certain spaces, use particular language, express
particular emotions, or engage in particular deeds that
were part and parcel of the performance of maleness
and individualism. Moreover, the surgical expectation
that surgery be a resident’s only priority was incom-
patible with the macro-cultural belief that the world of
home and hearth is a woman’s primary focus. Also, to
the degree that they tried to enact the traditional surgi-
cal identity, female chiefs had trouble fulfilling cultural
expectations in the eyes of significant others outside the
hospital. Thus, female chiefs were interested in challeng-
ing the iron man identity and valuing a different set of
practices that, as women, they could more easily accom-
plish.
Some of the male chiefs also supported change
because they too felt that the iron man role hampered
fulfilling their expectations for other social roles they
valued: the roles of father (rather than hypercommitted
worker), of egalitarian male (rather than superordinate
male), or of “patient-centered” resident (rather than indi-
vidualistic hero).
The third subgroup of reformers, the in-coming male
and female interns, were unlike the female and male
chief residents who had been trained under the iron man
system. As new members of the profession, they were
ignorant of traditional practices, the accounts that jus-
tified these practices, and the roles that imparted moral
value to them. Although they did not yet understand the
surgical social world, they were quite familiar with the
arguments that had been made by the patients’ rights
and residents’ rights reformers and thought they made
sense. To them, working 80 hours a week rather than
120 sounded like a good idea. Thus, interns supported
reform practices initially because this is what they were
taught before they started the program.
Similar Defender and Reformer Tactics at
Calhoun and Advent
Similar Defender Socialization Tactics at
Calhoun and Advent
During intern orientation week, the directors at Advent
and Calhoun announced the details of the new programs
in “grand rounds” meetings that were attended by staff
surgeons and residents. With the introduction of the new
programs, interns at both hospitals tried for a very brief
period to comply with the new practices by handing off
post-ops and admits to night floats, enlisting help from
their chiefs with post-round to-dos, and not coming in
on Saturdays when not scheduled to do so. Defender
chiefs, who played an important role in the socialization
of interns because they were responsible for their pro-
fessional development, almost immediately began to dis-
suade interns from putting the new practices into effect.
These chiefs led interns to break with their old iden-
tities by losing their tempers; insulting the interns; and
threatening them whenever they tried to hand off rou-
tine work, accept help from others, or avoid coming in
on Saturdays. They taught interns new role expectations
by telling stories and engaging in gossip. And they gave
interns explicit and implicit feedback about the gap that
existed between interns’ displayed persona and the tra-
ditional surgical identity.
Their socialization tactics initially led interns to
refrain from attempting handoffs, from asking for help
with post-round to-dos, and from avoiding coming in on
Saturdays. Given this early blocking of change, the dif-
ferences in outcomes at Calhoun and Advent might be
explained as resulting from a difference in socialization
tactics or in intern response to them at the two hospi-
tals. But if this were the case, I would have expected to
hear about either different socialization tactics used at
the two hospitals or different intern responses to these
tactics. I heard about neither.
Instead, socialization was ineffective in ultimately
blocking change at both hospitals, because at the same
time interns were being taught traditional expectations
by defender chiefs, they were being taught new expec-
tations by reformer chiefs. Because they received mixed
messages from defenders and reformers, most interns
did not internalize traditional expectations. The reason
most stopped attempting handoffs and seeking help with
post-round to-dos early in the year was not because they
thought these practices harmed patient care or their own
education but because they feared retribution from their
defender chiefs, who influenced access to their training
and career placement.
Similar Internal Reformer Mobilization at
Calhoun and Advent
Whereas defenders’ socialization tactics initially led
interns to stop individually engaging in reform practices,
subsequent reformer mobilization allowed them to col-
lectively engage in these activities later. At both Calhoun
and Advent, reformers responded to resistance by mobi-
lizing with one another in hospital spaces that existed
apart from defenders (for a detailed account of this rela-
tional mobilization at Advent, see Kellogg 2009). His-
torically, residents on a particular service had gathered
together every evening between 5 p.m. and 7 p.m. for
“afternoon rounds” to review the patient care work that
they had performed for each patient that day. Afternoon
rounds meetings on services (e.g., the vascular service)
staffed with only reformers allowed for isolation from
defenders, interaction among reformers, and inclusion of
residents in all work positions involved in the practice
targeted for change.
In these spaces, reformers built a sense of efficacy—
a feeling of hope that collective action efforts against
defenders could be successful and an assurance that
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reformers from different subgroups, acting together for
change, would each complete the diverse tasks required
to successfully accomplish new handing-off and help-
ing practices. Here, too, reformers developed a col-
lective “we” across subgroups. Reformers referred to
themselves as “progressive residents,” “team players,”
“complete doctors,” and “surgeons with a life.” Addi-
tionally, in these spaces reformers at both hospitals cre-
ated cross-group frames by discussing the unfairness
of maintaining traditional practice and by talking about
the legitimacy of new versus old practices. Reformers’
frames—that both men and women could be good sur-
geons, that it was possible to achieve continuity of care
in the team, that it was important to learn by reading
and working in the clinic in addition to learning by oper-
ating, and that residents learned better when they were
well rested—ran counter to defenders’ frames. Reform-
ers’ sense of efficacy, identity, and frames were inclusive
of the key concerns of each of the reformer subgroups—
female chiefs, male chiefs, and interns—so they allowed
reformers to see themselves as a unified group with a
common adversary, the “old school” residents.
As they built up feelings of opposition against defend-
ers, reformer chiefs began actively supporting hand-
offs and helping, and interns on teams led by defender
chiefs began attempting handoffs and requesting help
with post-round to-dos. Earlier in the year, ignorant
of the traditional iron man expectations, interns had
attempted handoffs and sought help, and defender chiefs
had responded to what they considered their lack of
capability with socialization tactics that were designed to
teach the interns iron man expectations. But now, interns
knew better. They had demonstrated their knowledge
of traditional expectations by refraining from handoff
and helping behavior after their early attempts had been
rebuffed by defenders. Interns’ engagement in handoff
and helping behaviors at this stage represented a “loyalty
norm” violation (Phillips et al. 2011) that sent a sig-
nal that their commitment to the defenders was impure.
By organizing with one another to attempt handoffs in
the face of resistance, reformers struck at the very heart
of the iron man’s world. Handoffs and helping chal-
lenged not only the traditional practices the defenders
were skilled in using but also the socially constructed
measures of performance (maleness, individualism, and
hypercommitment to work) that afforded them high sta-
tus in the profession and in society at large.
Similar Status-Based Countertactics at
Calhoun and Advent
In response to interns’ and reformer chiefs’ collective
engagement in handoff and helping behaviors, defend-
ers at both hospitals turned to new retaliation strate-
gies. They tried to divide the reformer coalition by using
status-based countertactics against the higher-status male
reformers. Defenders linked reform practices to a sta-
tus characteristic (gender) associated with the lower-
status female reformers, denigrated the male reformers
by associating them with these practices, and tried to
reintegrate male reformers into the defender group.
Defenders at Calhoun and Advent labeled the reform
as feminine by using gendered language to describe
reform practices and reformers. For example, they sug-
gested that the work hour reform had made surgical res-
idents “soft” and “weak.” An Advent defender said,
When you think of surgeons, they are rough around the
edges. They are hard core spitting and swearing and burp-
ing. Lots of flexing of muscles. Now the interns are a
bunch of softies.
They used gendered intonation that emphasized the
stereotypical female characteristic of emotionality, help-
fulness, and sensitivity to the needs of others. In talking
about reform at the end of the year, one Calhoun chief
asserted, “All of this stuff about [and here he imitated a
high female voice] ‘Ooooh, I’ll do this for you. Ooooh,
let me help you get out of here.’ It’s bulls–t. The interns
need to learn to do it themselves.”
In addition, defenders denigrated the status of male
reformers by associating them with these so-called “fem-
inine” practices. Sometimes, they directly told male
reformers that they were acting feminine when they tried
to use the practices. For example, one Calhoun female
reformer recounted, “If the interns said, ‘I’m going to
head out,’ the old school chiefs would ridicule them and
say, ‘You’re so weak. Don’t be a wuss.’ They do it to
the guys, not the women.”
At other times, defenders denigrated male reformers
indirectly by gossiping about their femininity behind
their backs. They called them “weak,” “softies,” “part-
timers,” “wusses,” “namby-pamby,” and “girls” for using
reform practices. One defender suggested that an intern
was not tough enough to handle hypercommitment to
work: “One weekend on call, [defender chief] com-
mented to me that he had hinted to the intern on Sat-
urday morning that maybe he would like to round with
him on Sunday. But the intern said, ‘No 0 0 0 not tomor-
row; that’s my day off.’ Wow. That would have been
unheard of 0 0 0 0 He [the intern] should have been able to
handle it 0 0 0 0”
Defenders also implied that male reformers were more
attracted to the female realm of home and hearth than
to the male world of the operating room. One Calhoun
defender mocked an intern who had left at the end of a
work shift to go to a picnic: “I had one intern who (at
the end of his shift) was like, ‘Gotta go. I have to leave,
I have a picnic.’ I kid you not, that’s what he said, ‘I
have a picnic to go to. I’m going to stay for a little and
then I have to go.’ ” Going to a picnic rather than the
operating room, the defender implied, was something no
real man would do.
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Finally, they tried to “reintegrate” (Heimer and Staffen
1995) male reformers by visibly rewarding them with
male camaraderie and games if they backed off their
reformist stance and by excluding those who persisted in
reform. For example, at Advent, defenders stopped invit-
ing persistent male reformers to work out at the gym, to
“make rounds” (check out newly hired nurses), or to “go
to the office” (go to the front lobby to rate the attrac-
tiveness of women coming in and out). This was clearly
meant to sanction reformers’ involvement in reform
because defenders had included them in these activi-
ties before reformers had begun attempting handoffs in
the face of resistance. Defenders also denied persistent
reformers the special teaching reserved for members of
the Boys’ Club. An Advent defender explained how he
had rewarded a male intern who had ignored the new
rules: “Who do I want to hook up? People want to oper-
ate. When I throw the juniors a bone, it is because they
have worked hard for me. Like [male intern]. I let him
do a splenectomy 0 0 0 0 That was a total bone. It is a third-
or fourth-year case.”
Why did defenders target male reformers? Histori-
cally, performing well had required a resident to work
as an individual and to be the first one at the hospi-
tal and the last to leave. Under reform, performing well
required residents to accomplish work as a team and to
leave the hospital at the end of the day. Because long-
standing cultural beliefs code (1) men as individualistic
and women as communal (e.g., Eagly et al. 2000, Fiske
et al. 2002) and (2) men as working long hours and
women as leaving early to take care of responsibilities
at home (e.g., Bailyn 2006, Perlow 1998), the reform
threatened to overturn the gender hierarchy by allowing
women to demonstrate greater competence than men.
By joining with women to fight for reform practices,
male reformers were displaying disloyalty by supporting
a group that the defenders viewed as a direct threat to
their male group. As males, these reformers were good
targets for conversion to defenders because their own
status was supported, in part, by the traditional gender
hierarchy.
Why did defenders invoke gender in their countertac-
tics? Labeling male reformers as female was an effective
way to threaten their status because females have tradi-
tionally had lower status in surgery than males. More-
over, it was an easy “frame extension” (Snow et al.
1986) to label reform practices as feminine because cul-
tural beliefs link reform practices—communal work and
fewer hours spent in the workplace—to females.
Were defenders’ tactics organized? Although defend-
ers did not formally plan out what responses to use
and not to use, through their male bonding activities,
they did form a collective (e.g., Martin and Collinson
1999). They strategized and coordinated their resistance
efforts during casual dinners in the cafeteria, discussions
in the surgical lounge, hallway conversations, and other
occasions on which they gathered. When I asked in an
end-of-year interview if they got together to discuss the
change, one defender chief at Calhoun responded, “We’ll
sort of congregate down in the cafeteria. You sit down
and talk, and people tell stories and stuff like that. Basi-
cally, we just blow off steam. So when the interns started
trying get out of here at 5:59, of course we talked about
it 0 0 0 0 We needed to beat it into these guys that it wasn’t
acceptable.”
Subsequent Divergence at
Calhoun and Advent
Different Outcomes at Calhoun and Advent
Although early processes were similar at Calhoun and
Advent, through an interplay of tactics and countertac-
tics over the course of the year, reformers’ long-term
actions in the two hospitals diverged. Calhoun reform-
ers abandoned their coalition and failed to accomplish
social movement implementation and microinstitutional
change. Advent reformers maintained their coalition in
the face of these countertactics and successfully imple-
mented the changes needed for reform.
To determine success or failure, I gauged changes in
everyday practice that, in my prechange interviews, res-
idents at Calhoun and Advent indicated would have to
occur to ensure compliance with the new regulation. As
noted earlier, interns would need to hand off any incom-
plete post-ops and admits by 6 p.m., to accept help with
post-round to-dos, and to avoid coming in on unsched-
uled Saturdays. In turn, chiefs would need to refrain
from punishing them for handing off work uncompleted
by 6 p.m., to help interns with post-round to-dos, and to
tell them not to come in on Saturdays unless they were
scheduled to do so.
To measure end-of-year intern actions, I gathered both
intern self-reports and chief reports about the interns; to
measure end-of-year chief actions, I gathered chief self-
reports and intern reports about the chiefs. Self-reports
and other-reports were consistent with one another.
Calhoun residents did not implement these everyday
practices and, indeed, falsified the time sheets they sub-
mitted to the ACGME in order to cover up their actual
work practices. As one intern at Calhoun confessed,
“The only way the outside knows if we do is by what
residents report. And I would be a fool to report Calhoun
and ruin my own training.” So, at Calhoun, despite their
initial support for change, most residents reversed their
early practices by the end of the year and resisted imple-
mentation of change.
In contrast, at Advent, interns engaged in reform prac-
tices at the end of the year. In addition, chiefs who had
been defenders at the beginning of the year by the end
of the year had begun to use these reform practices too
(see Table 3).
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Table 3 Divergence in End-of-Year Outcomes at Calhoun
and Advent
Calhoun Calhoun Advent
beginning- end- beginning- End-of-
of-year % of-year % of-year % year %
consistently consistently consistently consistently
using using using using
reform reform reform reform
Residents practices practices practices practices
Male chiefs 40 0 33 100
Female chiefs 100 100 100 100
Male interns 100 0 100 100
Female interns 100 0 (tailored)a 100 100
% Consistently 81 19 71 100
using reform
practices
Notes. Calhoun: N = 16 (five male chiefs, three female chiefs,
five male interns, and three female interns). Advent: N = 14 (six
male chiefs, one female chief, four male interns, and three female
interns).
aTailored indicates that Calhoun female interns tailored their prac-
tices to the chiefs with whom they were working at the time.
Thus, we have two organizations with similar external
pressures and resources, similar organizational charac-
teristics, similar internal reformer mobilization, and sim-
ilar defender countertactics. Yet in one case reform was
not implemented, and in the other case it was. How do
we account for this difference in outcomes? To do so,
we need to understand the difference in initial degree
of status threat posed to the male resident group overall
by female residents at the two hospitals even before the
new night float programs were introduced.
Different Initial Status Threat at
Calhoun and Advent
Historically, for residents in surgery, there had been an
unequal distribution of resources (such as teaching by
staff surgeons and recommendations for further train-
ing) between male and female residents. As a group,
males dominated females, and this historic fact was
important to the men who later became male reform-
ers when the night float program was introduced. Such
dominance enabled all male residents, iron men or not,
to maintain their privilege (e.g., Glick and Fiske 1999,
Ridgeway 2011).
Female residents posed two potential threats to the
status of the male group—a competitive threat and a
distinctiveness threat—and the degree to which they
posed these threats was different at the two hospitals:
at Calhoun the competitive and distinctiveness threats
posed by female residents were strong, whereas at
Advent they were weak.
Competition for resources is threatening to a higher
status group because resources that were previously
reserved for its members become available to others as
well; as growing numbers in a lower status group seek
access to new rewards, advantaged groups seek to main-
tain their former privilege (e.g., Blalock 1973, South
et al. 1982). In surgery, male residents traditionally have
occupied the highest positions of the surgical hierarchy.
As in hospitals across the country, at both Calhoun and
Advent, most years there were much fewer female than
male chief residents. Female residents comprised about
a third of all residents at each hospital, but they tended
to be clustered at the bottom of the surgical hierarchy,
with only about 10%–15% comprising the chief resident
classes.
But during the year reforms were implemented at
both hospitals, by chance Calhoun had an unusually
high percentage of female chiefs—three out of eight
total chiefs (38% female chiefs)—much higher than at
Advent, where out of a total of seven chiefs, there was
only one female (14% female chiefs). Because the male
group had historically been dominant, increasing num-
bers of women in leadership positions at Calhoun posed
a competitive threat to the male resident group that did
not exist at Advent. In addition, one of the female chiefs
at Calhoun posed an additional competitive threat to
the male group that year by applying for a postresi-
dency position in trauma surgery,2 a specialty tradition-
ally reserved for males. Male residents at Calhoun expe-
rienced this anomalous spike in the number of females in
leadership positions as a threat. In my prechange inter-
views at Calhoun, several male residents mentioned that
the number of female residents who would be serving
in the chief position that year was unusually high. One
male chief at Calhoun noted, “This year is a strange
year; the women are taking over.” Female chiefs at
Calhoun also commented on the competitive threat they
posed to the male group. One said, “This is one of the
few times when you can go straight from being the slave
to being the competitor.”
Female residents posed not only a competitive threat
to the male group at Calhoun, but they also posed a
threat to the distinctiveness of the male group. When
women act in “masculine” ways, they challenge the dis-
tinctiveness between men and women. Blurring distinc-
tions that are usually made between categories (e.g., men
versus women) is threatening to the higher-status group
because it suggests that these distinctions and the ben-
efits associated with them are illusory and illegitimate
(e.g., Berdahl 2007).
In some respects, female residents at both Advent and
Calhoun blurred the distinction between men and women
by acting the way high-status males acted: they told the
same kinds of stories about idiotic medical residents,
unflappable staff surgeons, and annoying nurses; they
strode rather than walked; they paged jokes back and
forth to other residents; and they lobbied their chief res-
idents for more difficult cases.
What was striking, though, was that the female res-
idents at Calhoun used a wider range of high-status
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[7
6.1
19
.10
5.6
1]
 on
 05
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
17
, a
t 1
4:1
5 .
 Fo
r p
ers
on
al 
us
e o
nly
, a
ll r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Kellogg: Status-Based Countertactics to Block Social Movement Implementation and Microinstitutional Change
1558 Organization Science 23(6), pp. 1546–1570, © 2012 INFORMS
“male” actions than the female residents at Advent did.
At Calhoun, they dressed and behaved like the high-
status male residents, whereas at Advent, they looked
and acted more like low-status actors. In the the oper-
ating room—one of the most important spaces in the
hospital where status is performed—Calhoun female res-
idents wore the same surgical caps the male residents
wore; at Advent, they wore the “shower caps” worn
by the lower-status nurses. Calhoun female residents
wore no jewelry or makeup; at Advent, they wore both.
Calhoun female chiefs gave their interns nicknames; at
Advent, only the male chiefs exercised this prerogative.
Calhoun female residents told stories of their going out
drinking; Advent female residents said they rarely did
so. Calhoun female chiefs reported “throwing bones”
(assigning cases that were officially above the required
resident year, a typical practice among male residents)
to their interns. Advent female chiefs did not. Calhoun
female residents recounted episodes where they had
aggressively “told a staff surgeon to move over” in the
operating room so that they could take charge. Advent
female residents reported avoiding even being suspected
of doing this.
By acting masculine in so many ways, Calhoun female
residents laid claim to the higher-status male position.
By doing so, they made it difficult for the male residents
to distinguish themselves from the female residents and,
consequently, threatened the status of the Calhoun male
resident group.
To explore why and how the coalition broke apart at
Calhoun and not at Advent, I coded pre- and postinter-
view data by resident for each of the 30 residents. As I
explain below, I found that, in the context of high initial
competitive and distinctiveness threats, male reformers
at Calhoun experienced a greater level of concern about
loss of male privilege in the face of defenders’ counter-
tactics than did those at Advent (see Table 4). As a con-
sequence of being concerned about the loss of male priv-
ilege, male reformers at Calhoun distanced themselves
from reform practices and aligned with male defenders,
leading to the failure of widespread reform at Calhoun.
Before detailing the process by which a difference
in the level of status threat at the two hospitals led to
the different implementation outcomes, it is helpful to
address two alternative explanations for this difference
in outcomes. First, is it possible that the greater differ-
ence in how male versus female residents behaved at
Advent allowed reformers to be more confident in stand-
ing up to defenders because they had already seen dif-
ferent approaches? But if this was what led reformers to
stand up to defenders at Advent, I would have expected
to have heard about the initial diversity in practices crit-
ical to intern floorwork, such as helping and handoffs,
rather than diversity in practices related to dress and
demeanor; I did not.
A second possible explanation is that female residents
at Calhoun engaged in more male practices because
Calhoun was a more hostile environment to women, and
so there was greater pressure on women to act like men.
If this were true, one could attribute the difference in
outcomes to a difference in female reformer effort at
the two hospitals, with Calhoun female residents not
attempting change as aggressively as Advent female res-
idents because they felt more threatened. My data do not
support this explanation. First, my context is different
from other studies that have observed the phenomenon
of women acting like men to fit in. For example, in
Turco’s (2010) study of the leveraged buyout industry,
women comprised less than 10% of professional staff
and were working in the absence of new frames, mobi-
lizing structures, and political opportunities that would
have given them new resources for change. So they acted
as individuals and fearfully conformed to male practices
to fit in. In contrast, in my case, women comprised about
a third of the residency program in each hospital and
were working during a time when a social movement
was providing resources to reformers inside hospitals to
challenge the status quo. Second, my data do not sup-
port the claim that the female residents at Calhoun felt
threatened. Turco’s women reported that they felt like
they had to watch SportsCenter in order to survive. In
contrast, the women at Calhoun reported engaging in
masculine acts with glee. They said that they enjoyed
the “edgy” surgery culture, said that “it’s part of why
I went into surgery,” and felt that “women can do any-
thing these guys can do, and probably do it better or we
wouldn’t have gotten this far.” Although females acting
masculine may be an act of submission in some cases, I
find that it may also be an act of defiance, and the latter
was the case at Calhoun.
Capitulating to Status-Based Countertactics at
Calhoun
Calhoun High-Status Reformers Experience Concerns
About Loss of High Status. Although I did not ask spe-
cific questions about status, when I did ask about barri-
ers to change, male reformers at Calhoun expressed two
concerns related to the loss of high status. Their first
concern was that they would be categorized in a lower
status group against their will: they worried that they
would be seen as female. One Calhoun male intern said,
You hear all the time that “you don’t work as hard as me.
You don’t operate as much. You’re weak.” You know the
whole “back in the day” argument, and the thing is, you
do get concerned about “are you tough enough?”
Another Calhoun male intern related:
I think you end up feeling inadequate because of the
level of expectations from the old school chiefs. Because,
historically, the intern always showed up at 4 a.m. and
basically pre-rounded. Now, it’s supposed to be working
rounds, so no pre-rounding, and we are all supposed to
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Table 4 Effects of Initial Status Threat on Response to Status-Based Countertactics
Response to status-based Calhoun strong Advent weak
countertactics Associated practices status threat status threat
Male reformers N = 7 N = 6
Experience concerns about loss of
high status
Express concerns about being seen as
feminine
7 0
Express concerns about being left out of
Boys’ Club
6 0
Distance themselves from lower-
status practices and reformers
Distance themselves from feminine labels 6 0
Align with male defenders 6 0
Consistently refrain from reform practices 7 0
Female reformers N = 6 N = 4
Experience concerns about loss of
high status
Express concerns about being seen as
feminine
0 0
Express concerns about being left out of
Boys’ Club
0 0
Distance themselves from lower-
status practices and reformers
Distance themselves from feminine labels 0 0
Align with male defenders 0 0
Consistently refrain from reform practices 0 0
get the numbers together. But, with the old school guys,
the few times I haven’t come in early, it hasn’t been
acceptable 0 0 0 0 They are obviously pissed off, you know,
rolling their eyes and calling you weak. It would also
happen in the evenings, if you signed something out 0 0 0 0
They make you feel like you’re a wuss with an easy life.
That you’re not man enough to be a surgeon. You know,
like, “When I was a kid I had to walk to school in five
feet of snow without my shoes on!”
Concerns about being seen as feminine were shared
by male reformer chiefs. One Calhoun male reformer
chief noted,
I just wish these guys would stop making comments
about the 80-hour work week 0 0 0 0 I think that it is very
undermining to 0 0 0 all of us, to make us feel like we’re
any less of a surgeon because of the new rules 0 0 0 0 They
just like to say how tough they were when they did it.
The second concern Calhoun male reformers had was
that they would not be accepted within the higher-status
group because they were not seen as prototypical mem-
bers of that group—they worried that they would be
excluded from the high-status Iron Man Boys’ Club. One
Calhoun male intern said,
You want to be respected by these guys. There’s a lot of
joking around in surgery, and when you’re accepted by
them, it’s great 0 0 0 0 And, if you’re not, they can make
your life miserable.
Similarly, a Calhoun male reformer chief said,
There is a lot of machismo in surgery. It is a pissing con-
test. Who is the slickest? It’s like the Army. Very hierar-
chical, don’t be weak. You fell asleep in your 60th hour?
You’re so weak! The culture and that kind of thinking is
barbarous. But I would never say that in front of a staff
surgeon or another resident. I’m telling you because this
is anonymous 0 0 0 0 Everyone wants to be the last to leave.
[Otherwise] it would be like, “See, he left at 6:30.” That
kind of thing isn’t forgiven by these guys.
Calhoun High-Status Reformers Distance Themselves
from Lower-Status Practices and Reformers. Both male
and female residents reported that they noticed that male
reformers became noticeably concerned about maintain-
ing their male identity. One Calhoun female chief sug-
gested that the male chiefs who had initially supported
the work hour changes had been pressured into resisting
the changes “to show that they were macho.”
In an attempt to protect their male identity (and the
high status it conferred), male reformers at Calhoun dis-
tanced themselves from feminine labels by insisting that
they were not really weak, even though they were often
called so. One male intern told me how interns now did
not really have it much easier than those who had come
before:
There are a lot of little jokes about, you know, well, with
the 80-hour work week, you guys have it easy. I think
there have been some cases of where maybe we feel a
little less, I don’t know if “respected” is the right word,
because of an easier lifestyle–quality of life as an intern.
Similarly, a Calhoun male reformer chief pointed out
that it was ridiculous to suggest that people working so
many hours a week were weak:
The big thing is “you’re so weak.” But surgical residents
work a lot. We get worked unbelievably, for many, many
hours 0 0 0 0 We used to work iron man weekends from Sat-
urday at 6 am to Monday night. That is more than many
people work in a month 0 0 0 0 For all other people, even
80 hours is twice as long as their regular workweek 0 0 0 0
And 80 is really 90 or 100, and 100 is a lot. It is not
like all of a sudden I’m playing tennis and sitting in Star-
bucks in the middle of the day. I’m now able to do the
basic activities of daily living and bodily fluids.
The second way prior male reformers at Calhoun
attempted to protect their male identity was to align
themselves with male defenders, who, they implied,
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taught them the correct way to behave. One Calhoun
male intern described how, after he had worked initially
with reformer chiefs, he was assigned to a team with a
defender chief who, he joked, “made a man out of me”:
Then, I worked with [defender chief] who is old school,
hard core. He has a reputation for breaking down
the interns and toughening them up 0 0 0 I’d come in at
4:30 [a.m.] and we’d round at 5:30 [a.m.]. We decided
we wouldn’t follow the rules and we worked on Satur-
days. He was never trying to get me out [at the end of
the day]. He told me that a certain amount of stuff is
expected. Since then, I never leave at 6 p.m., ever.
Calhoun male reformer chiefs also aligned themselves
with male defenders by publicly declaring their alle-
giance to them. For example, as the end of the resident
year approached, two male staff surgeons were in the
running for a teaching award. The three female chiefs
and the male chief who had initially been the most vocal
male reformer all voted for the surgeon who had a rep-
utation for taking the most time with the residents. The
other four male chiefs voted for the other “very macho”
staff surgeon. Then, the male chief who initially had
voted for the first surgeon sent an e-mail to all of the
chiefs saying that he had changed his vote so that, as
he said, “the women wouldn’t win.” The female chiefs
were outraged.
One female chief described the incident to me in
detail: “So the one guy who was on our side said ver-
batim, over e-mail, ‘Well I don’t like him either, but
I’d rather see the girls suffer. Women shouldn’t be in
surgery anyway.’ So he changed his vote.” She went on
to say that “that e-mail was followed by the other guys
saying, ‘Ha-ha, we won.’ 0 0 0 The final e-mail was from
one of the guys who wrote and said, ‘You women, you
lost, and let’s face it—surgery is a man’s sport.’ 0 0 0 And
not a single one of the guys, in my class or any other
class, because, of course, everybody heard about it, said
that it was unacceptable.” Another female chief related,
“In the end, these guys have got to be part of the guys.”
Calhoun Reformers Fail to Implement Widespread
Reform. In the face of male chief reformer reversals,
female chiefs at Calhoun remained committed to their
activism. They did so because they questioned the old
school values of machismo, individualism, and hierar-
chy. In addition, they were on their way out of Calhoun
and felt they had little to lose by continuing to support
change.3
But the desertion of the male chiefs from the reformer
coalition struck a fatal blow to widespread reform imple-
mentation at Calhoun. In response to it, male interns
began to refrain from using reform practices across the
board. They no longer engaged in handoffs nor did
they accept help with post-round to-dos. They came in
on Saturday even when female chiefs instructed them
not to. The status of the male interns had already
been under attack because of the defenders’ status-based
countertactics. Once male chiefs deserted the coalition,
male interns faced even greater risks of being seen as
feminine (because now the only chiefs who used reform
practices were women) and being left out of the Boys’
Club (because it was the male chiefs, as the highest-
status males, who determined membership in this club).
In this context, it is not surprising that they abandoned
reform practices across the board to prove themselves as
men and stem further status loss. Several of them told
me that when they stayed late in the hospital, they rarely
did work the night float could not handle. Instead, they
said, they were in the hospital doing paperwork to main-
tain their reputations as “strong” residents who did not
hand off work.
Perhaps more interesting is the response the female
interns, which lends support to the argument that it was
status-based countertactics (using the status characteris-
tic of gender), not another form of countertactics, that
led to the failure of reform at Calhoun. In contrast to the
male interns who avoided reform practices when work-
ing with both male and female chiefs, female interns
tailored their practices to the chief with whom they
were working; when they worked with female chiefs,
they used reform practices, and when they worked with
male chiefs, they refrained from using reform practices.
Female interns continued to use reform practices when
working on teams led by female chiefs because they
were not concerned that using these practices would
lead others to see them as feminine (because they were
already seen that way) or to leave them out of the Boys’
Club (because they were already left out of it). Thus,
they had no need to abandon reform practices across the
board to protect their status. One female chief explained,
“Women don’t care about being macho 0 0 0 0 Women feel
like, if there’s no reason to do something, we won’t.” But
female interns did stop attempting handoffs when work-
ing on teams led by male chiefs because they no longer
believed that their challenges would lead to widespread
change in practice.
Not Capitulating to Status-Based Countertactics
at Advent
Advent High-Status Reformers Do Not Experience
Concerns About Loss of High Status. As they had at
Calhoun, defenders at Advent attempted to divide the
reformer coalition by labeling reform practices as fem-
inine, denigrating the masculinity of particular male
reformers, and trying to reintegrate male reformers into
the defender group. But male reformers at Advent did
not capitulate to these countertactics. Because the status
threat at Advent was low, male reformers there did not
experience concerns about loss of male privilege.
Table 4 shows that male reformers at Advent were
less concerned about being seen as feminine or being
left out of the Boys’ Club than were male reformers at
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Calhoun. “The old school guys like to say that handoffs
are weak, that we are all becoming soft,” one Advent
male reformer chief said. “I don’t buy it. Unless we do
things differently, surgery is never going to change.”
Advent High-Status Reformers Do Not Distance
Themselves from Lower-Status Practices and Reformers.
Because male reformers at Advent were not concerned
about loss of male privilege, they did not engage in com-
pensatory acts such as distancing themselves from fem-
inine labels or aligning themselves with defender males.
An Advent male intern recounted this incident:
One time at afternoon rounds, I hadn’t checked the film,
and the (defender) chief went off on me. It was totally
inappropriate. It was in front of everyone on the team.
He was like, “You look like you’re gonna cry. Are you
gonna cry?” He did it because earlier they had been mak-
ing [derogatory] comments about female residents, and
I didn’t join in 0 0 0 I refused to participate in that kind of
crap just so I could be accepted by them.
Advent Reformers Implement Widespread Reform.
The continued participation of the male chiefs in the
reformer coalition was critical to widespread reform
implementation at Advent. First, it meant that a greater
percentage of chiefs handled “minor snafus” that
resulted from the reform practices and did not denigrate
the interns who were involved in them. Second, because
male chiefs were part of the coalition, male interns’
concerns about loss of male privilege were minimized;
reform practices were not exclusively used by women,
and there was an alternative Boys’ Club (led by male
reformer chiefs) that they could be part of. Finally, both
male and female interns believed that their challenges
could lead to widespread change in practice, so they
continued to take the risks associated with change.
Because male reformers at Advent maintained their
coalition with female reformers, they continued to put
pressure on defenders to change. The continual lack
of cooperation between defenders and reformers led to
breakdowns in everyday working procedures—handoffs
were fumbled, orders were ignored, instructions were
stonewalled—and defender chiefs found themselves try-
ing to manage a system that seemed to be falling apart.
Staff surgeons were dismayed about the growing dis-
array, but reformer chiefs pointedly argued that break-
downs were not a necessary outcome of the new sys-
tem. Work had been handled easily without lapses in
patient care, they said, whenever chiefs had been willing
to work in a less hierarchical manner by helping with
post-round to-dos and encouraging night floats to accept
handoffs.
The continuing breakdowns put defender chiefs in a
bind. By resisting handoffs and helping, defender chiefs
were fulfilling traditional iron man expectations, but they
were not getting routine work accomplished. They felt
they could not encourage interns to hand off and seek
help with work, for then they would not be acting as true
“commanders” of would-be iron men. But they also felt
it was their obligation to be “go-to guys” for the staff
surgeons by ensuring that all work on patients was done.
In the end, iron man chiefs decided that their obliga-
tion to the staff surgeons was stronger than their obliga-
tion to teach interns in traditional ways. One defender
chief explained, “If something doesn’t get done, as the
chief resident, you are responsible. You are it. The staff
surgeons expect you to take care of everything 0 0 0 0 You
are expected to know everything and do everything, or
you get a beating for it.”
Presented with both a crisis and new practices that
were successful, defender chiefs who had previously
argued that the reforms undermined patient care now
began to acknowledge that these reform practices were
not harmful. They now began to suggest that although
the interns might learn more slowly, they would learn all
they needed to know by the end of residency. The new
support of the prior defender chiefs at Advent made it
easier for interns to attempt handoffs and ask for help,
and these practices became the new steady-state practice
at Advent.
How did these changes affect patient care at Advent?
Because there are so many care providers involved in
surgical patient care, there were too many confounding
factors to be able to objectively measure the effect. To
do that, one would need to conduct a controlled study
of medical errors that closely tracked all these inputs
in addition to resident work hours and errors. How-
ever, I do have subjective data on the consequences of
change. In my end-of year interviews, prior defender
chiefs expressed surprise that the changes had had no
negative impact on patient care. They noted that some
minor things such as the ordering of noncritical tests
were delayed, but even they did not think that these mis-
steps negatively affected patient care.
Discussion
At both Advent and Calhoun, reformers from differ-
ent identity groups mobilized with one another for
change, and internal defenders tried to divide their coali-
tion using status-based countertactics. At both hospitals,
defenders targeted male reformers using the status char-
acteristic of gender. And at both hospitals, defenders’
labeling of male reformers as feminine was threaten-
ing because females have traditionally had lower sta-
tus in surgery and in society than males, and because
the reform practices themselves—communal work and
fewer hours spent in the workplace—were easily typed
as “female.”
At Calhoun, where status threat for male reformers
was high to begin with because the male group was
under competitive and distinctiveness threat from female
residents, the higher-status male reformers were anxious
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[7
6.1
19
.10
5.6
1]
 on
 05
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
17
, a
t 1
4:1
5 .
 Fo
r p
ers
on
al 
us
e o
nly
, a
ll r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Kellogg: Status-Based Countertactics to Block Social Movement Implementation and Microinstitutional Change
1562 Organization Science 23(6), pp. 1546–1570, © 2012 INFORMS
about the loss of male privilege in the face of defend-
ers’ status-based countertactics; they tried to protect
their status by distancing themselves from the practices
of lower-status reformers and aligning themselves with
higher-status defenders. In contrast, at Advent, where
the initial status threat was low, the higher-status male
reformers did not experience concerns about loss of
male privilege in response to defender countertactics,
and they maintained their coalition.
I use these findings to introduce the concept of status-
based countertactics (see Figure 1). When a reform
threatens the socially constructed measures of perfor-
mance that have historically allowed high-status mem-
bers to distinguish themselves from others, many of
them are likely to resist it. In contrast, members, high-
status or otherwise, who have had difficulty comply-
ing with these historical measures of performance are
likely to become internal reformers. Different groups of
these reformers may have different identities and build
alliances across identity lines that require reformers with
different statuses to collaborate with one another.
Defenders may try to divide such cross-identity
reformer coalitions by using status-based countertac-
tics against higher-status reformers whose own status is
supported by the traditional hierarchy that the reform
threatens and who are, therefore, displaying disloyalty
to their high-status group by siding with the lower-status
reformers. Defenders may link reform practices to a sta-
tus characteristic associated with lower-status reform-
ers, denigrate the higher-status reformers by associat-
ing them with these practices, and recruit higher-status
reformers to the defender group. Defenders will likely
use a status characteristic whose value hierarchy is under
fire from the reform and which can be easily linked to
reform practices because of cultural beliefs that associate
reform practices with the lower-value status characteris-
tic. In the case presented here, gender fit well.
Status-based countertactics will be most successful in
dividing the reformer coalition when the targeted high-
status reformers are already under a high degree of status
threat (e.g., competitive threat or distinctiveness threat).
Under these conditions, higher-status reformers are par-
ticularly likely to experience concerns about being cat-
egorized in the lower-status group against their will and
not being accepted by the higher-status group because
they are not seen as exemplary members of this group.
These concerns may lead them to distance themselves
from the practices of lower-status reformers and visibly
align themselves with higher-status defenders to prove
themselves as members of the high-status group and to
protect the privileges associated with this group. This, in
turn, can undermine the multi-identity reformer coalition
and cause reform implementation and microinstitutional
change to fail.
Contributions to Our Understanding of
Social Movements
This paper makes several contributions to our under-
standing social movements. First, theorists who have
examined social movement implementation have demon-
strated that internal reformers are key players in imple-
mentation because they participate in everyday organi-
zational practices in ways that external reformers can-
not (e.g., Binder 2002, Katzenstein 1998, Kellogg 2009,
Lounsbury 2001, Meyerson 2001, Meyerson and Scully
1995, Moore 2008, O’Mahony and Bechky 2008, Rae-
burn 2004, Rao et al. 2003, Scully and Segal 2002,
Zald et al. 2005). However, these theorists have not
explored the dynamics associated with mobilization
across diverse identities inside organizations. This is
unfortunate because, as organizations are composed of
actors with different identities who operate within a vari-
ety of institutional and organizational rules (e.g., Morrill
1995, Morrill and Rudes 2010, Morrill et al. 2003, Zald
et al. 2005), internal reformers often must create coali-
tions across multiple identities to accomplish change.
For example, during the implementation of environmen-
tal reform inside universities, a multi-identity coalition
was required for successful challenge: student reformers
needed to ally with faculty and administrator reformers
to accomplish change in recycling practices (Lounsbury
2001). According to the argument presented here, higher-
status faculty and administrator reformers may have
needed to stand up to defenders on campus who threat-
ened the status of faculty and administrator reformers by
drawing on culturally available meanings about students
to paint all reformers as immature or strident activists.
But such countertactics and responses to them have not
been previously examined. I demonstrate that coalitions
composed of reformers with diverse social identities are
particularly vulnerable to attack because different iden-
tities are often associated with different statuses. Inter-
nal defenders can demobilize higher-status reformers by
linking reform practices to a status characteristic asso-
ciated with lower-status reformers, denigrating higher-
status reformers by associating them with these practices,
and trying to reintegrate higher-status reformers into the
defender group.
Second, prior research has shown that success in
implementing social movement reform depends on the
strength of external and internal resources; on the inter-
nal reformers’ connection with those who control these
resources; and on intraorganizational contextual fac-
tors such as spaces, networks, and logics that facilitate
reformer mobilization (e.g., Creed et al. 2002, Kellogg
2011b, Raeburn 2004, Weber et al. 2009b). This study
highlights an additional intraorganizational contextual
factor that can shape reform implementation—degree of
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Figure 1 Using Status-Based Countertactics to Block Social Movement Implementation and Microinstitutional Change
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initial status threat to high-status reformers. When status
threat is initially high, high-status reformers are more
likely to feel concerned about loss of privilege in the
face of status-based countertactics and to distance them-
selves from lower-status reformers to protect their iden-
tity and its rewards.
Finally, theorists of social movements and organiza-
tions have suggested that status affects reform imple-
mentation in two ways. First, high-status actors may
be at the vanguard of reform implementation because
they have more latitude to defy conventions because
they are secure in their group membership and likely to
be imitated because they are visible role models (Rao
et al. 2005). Second, actors inside organizations may
refrain from mobilizing to protect their status if external
countermovements portray reform as immoral or unsafe
(Weber et al. 2009b). The findings presented in this
paper suggest that high-status actors may not be at the
vanguard of reform implementation but rather of reform
resistance in cases where reform threatens the socially
constructed measures of performance that have histori-
cally allowed them to distinguish themselves from oth-
ers. In addition, threats to the status of internal reformers
can be posed not only by external countermovements
but also by internal defenders, defenders can threaten
the status of internal reformers not only by portraying
reform as immoral or unsafe but also by linking reform
practices to a status characteristic associated with lower-
status reformers in the coalition, and threats to status can
not only prevent mobilization from happening but also
help reverse it once it has occurred.
Contributions to Our Understanding of
Institutional Change
This paper also makes several contributions to our
understanding of institutional change. First, where early
neo-institutional theory suffered from an actorless bias
(e.g., Barley and Tolbert 1997, DiMaggio 1988, Hirsch
and Lounsbury 1997, Powell and DiMaggio 1991),
recent studies have explored the agency by which
members accomplish institutional change. Actors now
abound, doing all kinds of things (e.g., Barley 2008,
Battilana 2011, Colyvas and Powell 2006, Lawrence
et al. 2009, Powell and Colyvas 2008, Reay et al.
2006, Tolbert et al. 2011, Zilber 2007). And yet, with
all of this emphasis on agency, no studies have suffi-
ciently explained why these newly empowered actors
have not brought about big changes. Why all of this
agency and not much big change? I demonstrate that it
is not because actors do not matter but that, when they
encounter obstacles, they can sometimes circumvent or
overcome them (as at Advent), and sometimes they can-
not (as at Calhoun). Sometimes obstacles impede actors
or require more finessed moves born from an under-
standing of how status and interests can sway collec-
tive action. Adding defenders to the story of institutional
change helps us see that, although we should not ignore
actors, we should not overly simplistically assume that
they will be efficacious as long as they have access
to the right cultural and political resources. Theorists
examining institutional change at the macro level have
shown us that actors exist in a complex and dynamic
system comprising mobilization and countermobilization
(e.g., Ingram and Rao 2004, Ingram et al. 2010, Levy
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and Scully 2007). To date, countermoves inside organi-
zations have been undertheorized, and institutional sta-
bility has often been assumed to be a result of iner-
tia or of dominant cultural beliefs or norms that actors
strain against (e.g., Dacin et al. 2010). Adding an under-
standing of countertactics inside organizations helps us
to address the puzzle of why we see such constrained
change despite such dynamic agency.
Second, previous research suggests that organizations
are most likely to subvert institutional pressures when
such pressures are weak or inconsistent, when there
are high symbolic gains from program adoption but
also high costs associated with implementation, and
when organizational actors have professional identities
or backgrounds that conflict with the proposed reform
(e.g., Anteby 2010, Barley 1986, Edelman and Petterson
1999, Edelman and Suchman 1997, Fligstein 1985,
Heimer 1999, Heimer and Staffen 1998, Lounsbury
2007, Powell 1991, Sauder and Espeland 2009, Westphal
and Zajac 1994). The findings presented here demon-
strate that initial degree of status threat is also important
to the blocking of microinstitutional change. When high-
status actors are under a high degree of status threat
to begin with, they are particularly likely to experience
concerns about loss of privilege in the face of defenders’
status-based countertactics and to abandon the reformer
coalition to prove themselves as members of the high-
status group and to protect the privileges associated with
this group.
Third, these findings contribute to our understand-
ing of the relationship between status and institutional
change. Theorists studying this relationship have demon-
strated that status affects whether actors are likely to
try to change institutions. Low-status actors often feel
free to defy accepted practices because they are less
constrained by traditional ways of doing and thinking
(Haveman and Rao 1997, Leblebici et al. 1991, Powell
1991), because they are excluded regardless of their
actions (Phillips and Zuckerman 2001), or because they
are interested in the status mobility that institutional
change facilitates (Lounsbury 2002, Rao 1994). High-
status actors often feel free to defy accepted practices
because they are confident in their social acceptance,
because they judge that others in their field will try to
emulate their actions, and because they provide channels
for ongoing diffusion of practical knowledge to these
emulators (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006, Sutton and
Dobbin 1996, Weber et al. 2009a). The findings pre-
sented here show that status is important to institutional
change not only because an actor’s social position shapes
likely change behavior but also because status can be
used as a weapon by defenders of the status quo to
divide reformer coalitions pressing for change.
Finally, the paper contributes to our understanding of
gender and institutional change. Most research on gen-
der and institutional change tends to analyze changes
that affect equal opportunity for women, such as changes
in inequitable hiring and evaluation or promotion pro-
cesses that block women’s access and advancement
(e.g., Briscoe and Kellogg 2011, Castilla 2008, Dobbin
2009, Dobbin and Kelly 2007, Fernandez-Mateo, 2009,
Fernandez and Sosa 2005, Kelly et al. 2011). Some the-
orists have begun to explore how institutional change
itself is a gendered process. Because workplace poli-
cies, practices, rewards, and career paths are based on
long-standing norms and beliefs that suggest that those
who work long hours and continuously are the most
able, most committed, most “ideal workers” (Acker
1990, Bailyn 2006, Williams 2000), institutional change
requires challenging gendered understandings and role
expectations (e.g., Bailyn 2006; Ely et al. 2003, Fletcher
1999; Kelly et al. 2011; Perlow 1997, 1998; Rapoport
et al. 2002). In addition, gendered meanings are avail-
able as cultural resources that actors can draw on to fur-
ther their own ends (e.g., Einwohner et al. 2000, Taylor
and Whittier 1998). My findings add to our understand-
ing of gender and institutional change by demonstrating
that defenders can draw on the status characteristic of
gender to attempt to divide and conquer male–female
coalitions.
Future Research
This analysis raises several questions for future research.
First, to what extent is the concept of status-based coun-
tertactics generalizable to other settings? I would expect
to see status-based tactics in settings where (1) reform
indirectly challenges socially constructed measures of
performance that have historically allowed members of
the high-status group to distinguish themselves from oth-
ers and (2) cultural beliefs link reform practices to a sta-
tus characteristic associated with lower-status reformers.
For example, in the case presented here, the reformer
coalition was composed of men and women, chiefs and
interns, and whites and blacks. Defenders did not use
status-based countertactics against whites collaborating
with blacks even though whites were higher status than
blacks in surgery, because engaging in reform practices
did not challenge the racial hierarchy. In addition, the
status characteristic of race was not easily linked to
reform practices because no cultural beliefs associated
reform practices with the lower-status black reformers.
In contrast, defenders used status-based countertactics
against men collaborating with women because reform
practices, although not directly related to the gender
hierarchy, indirectly challenged this hierarchy. By join-
ing with women to fight for reform practices, men were
demonstrating disloyalty to the high-status male group.
In addition, the status characteristic of gender was easily
linked to reform practices because of cultural beliefs that
associated reform practices with the lower-status female
reformers.
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To generalize this argument to another situation, hos-
pitals are under pressure to implement “evidence-based
medicine” (i.e., improve patient care by using treatment
plans based on the best available scientific evidence).
This reform indirectly challenges socially constructed
measures of performance that have historically allowed
doctors to distinguish themselves from other, lower-
status members of the hospital staff such as “business
types.” According to long-standing cultural beliefs, (1)
doctors apply clinical judgment, business types apply
actuarial methods; (2) doctors are clinic-centered, busi-
ness types office-centered; and (3) doctors are con-
cerned with patient care, business types are concerned
with process improvement. Given these beliefs, a reform
that requires applying actuarial methods, doing office-
centered work, and engaging in process improvement
threatens to overturn the occupational hierarchy by
allowing business types to improve their performance
relative to doctors.
In their countertactics, defender physicians are likely
to use the status characteristic of their occupation
because labeling doctors as business types will be
particularly effective as business types have tradition-
ally had lower status in hospitals than doctors. Too,
it would be an easy frame extension because cultural
beliefs link reform practices—applying actuarial meth-
ods, doing office-centered work, and engaging in process
improvement—to the lower-status business identity.
Status-based countertactics are more likely to be more
successful in dividing the reformer group when doc-
tors are already under a higher degree of status threat
(e.g., competitive and distinctiveness threats) from busi-
ness types. For example, these countertactics are more
likely to be successful at a hospital where administra-
tors have just hired a number of business types who
are behaving like the high-status doctors by using med-
ical jargon or entering spaces such as medical clinics
that have historically been used only by doctors. Here,
in the face of status-based countertactics, reformer doc-
tors may be more likely to distance themselves from the
practices of lower-status business types and visibly align
themselves with defender doctors to prove themselves
as members of the high-status group and to protect the
privileges associated with this group. Future research can
help determine whether and how status-based counter-
tactics apply to other status characteristics, settings, and
reforms.
Second, this paper argues that the reason for the dif-
ference in outcomes between the two hospitals was that
a higher level of initial status threat at Calhoun led the
male reformers there to capitulate in the face of fur-
ther status threats posed by the defenders’ countertac-
tics. It is possible that this difference in initial status
threat also led Calhoun defenders to more aggressively
use status-based countertactics. (This would be consis-
tent with research showing that high-status actors sanc-
tion lower-status actors who try to engage in high-status
behaviors; see, e.g., Eagly et al. 2000, Glick and Fiske
1999, Heilman et al. 2004.) If this were the case, then
the difference in outcomes at the two hospitals would
be the result of both the difference in initial status threat
and the difference in degree of use of status-based coun-
tertactics. My data demonstrate no differences in the
degree to which these countertactics were talked about in
interviews with residents at the two hospitals; however,
interview data are not the best way to measure actual
frequency of countertactics used. Future research could
investigate this alternative explanation further.
Third, both theorists and activists are often concerned
about whether change actually happens and whether it
actually serves those whom it was meant to protect
(e.g., Castilla and Benard 2010, Kalev et al. 2006).
Because this study was conducted in only two organiza-
tions and used qualitative methods, it is not well suited
for answering such questions. Recent evidence suggests
that hospitals across the country are still struggling to
implement reform. The regulations took effect in 2003,
yet in the intervening years, the ACGME has had to
take action against some hospitals that have continued
to violate them; even more disturbing, there is enough
evidence of inaccuracies in residents’ reports to suggest
that many of the hospitals that are thought to be com-
plying with the regulations in fact are not (Institute of
Medicine 2008). In 2007, pressured by reformers who
argued that the initial work hour regulation introduced
by the ACGME had not been effective in solving patient
care and resident safety problems, Congress directed the
Institute of Medicine to study the issue. Their report pre-
sented detailed evidence linking fatigue to cognitive and
behavioral errors outside of clinical settings (Institute of
Medicine 2008). In addition, a study in the 2004 New
England Journal of Medicine conducted within a clini-
cal setting found that reducing medical residents’ work
hours during rotations in the intensive care unit resulted
in a significant reduction in medical errors (Landrigan
et al. 2004). Yet further research is needed to determine
to what extent the reform has been implemented across
the country and to what extent it has improved patient
safety in places where it has been implemented.
Finally, the practical implications of these findings are
complicated. On the one hand, the findings suggest that
lower-status reformers would do well to respect tradi-
tional status hierarchies and behaviors to minimize the
threats to higher-status reformers and so limit defend-
ers’ ability to divide a multi-identity reformer coalition.
On the other hand, such status hierarchies and behav-
iors are often precisely the problem that lower status
reformers are interested in remedying. It is possible that
in some cases, lower-status reformers may be able to
improve their own organizational position more easily by
collaborating with higher-status reformers to accomplish
a reform such as resident work hour reduction (which
serves both low-status and high-status reformer interests)
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than by working solely with other low-status reformers
to accomplish a reform such as women’s rights (which
serves primarily low-status reformer interests). Future
research could investigate whether there are particular
kinds of settings or reforms in which it makes sense for
lower-status reformers to purposely minimize competi-
tiveness and distinctiveness threats to more easily col-
laborate with higher-status reformers.
In sum, this study demonstrates that implementing
reform inside organizations may require reformers not
only to mobilize with one another across diverse iden-
tities but also to stand up to defenders’ countertac-
tics in everyday organizational encounters. When a
reformer coalition is composed of reformers with differ-
ent statuses, defenders can leverage status to divide the
coalition by linking reform practices to a status char-
acteristic associated with lower-status reformers, den-
igrating higher-status reformers by associating them
with these practices, and trying to reintegrate higher-
status reformers into the defender group. When status
threat inside an organization is already high, higher-
status reformers are particularly likely to experience con-
cerns about loss of privilege. These concerns may lead
them to try to protect their position and its rewards
by distancing themselves from the practices of lower-
status reformers and visibly aligning themselves with
higher-status defenders. This, in turn, can undermine
the multi-identity reformer coalition and cause reform
implementation and microinstitutional change to fail. An
understanding of status-based countertactics is critical to
explaining how and when internal reformers can accom-
plish the institutional change that social movements try
so hard to win.
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Endnotes
1I also coded my end-of-year interview data to identify who
had initially used reform practices and who had opposed them.
I found that residents’ prechange beliefs were consistent with
their beginning-of-year use of reform practices as reported in
end-of-year interviews. I did not have access to performance
ratings to determine whether performance ratings correlated
with behavior.
2To protect the confidentiality of my informants and the hospi-
tals in which they worked, this specific subspecialty name has
been changed to another that reflects similar characteristics.
3All chiefs at both hospitals were leaving at the end of the
year, so the difference in outcomes at the two hospitals did not
stem from the fact that the Calhoun female chiefs had little
credibility because they were leaving.
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